Multi-Player Quantum Games by Benjamin, S C & Hayden, P M
Multi-Player Quantum Games
Simon C. Benjamin and Patrick M. Hayden
Centre for Quantum Computation, Clarendon
Laboratory, University of Oxford, OX1 3PU, UK.
Game theory is a mature eld of applied math-
ematics. It formalizes the conflict between com-
peting agents, and has found applications ranging
from economics through to biology [1,2]. Quan-
tum information is a young eld of physics. Re-
garding information as a physical quantity, rather
than mathematical entity, has lead to concepts
such as quantum computation [3]. Recently the
rst eorts have been made to combine these
elds; the fusion may lead to new insights into
the nature of information [4{6]. For two-player
games, it has been found that when the allowed
‘moves’ are extended to include everything quan-
tum mechanically possible, then the predominant
strategies in the game can disappear, and only
reappear if the players degrade the quantum co-
herence. Here we present the rst study of quan-
tum games with more than two players. We
demonstrate that such games can exhibit ‘coher-
ent’ equilibrium strategies which have no ana-
logue in classical games, or even in two-player
quantum games. These equilibria are generally
of a cooperative nature: quantum players can ex-
ploit their environment highly eciently through
the use of collaborative strategies.
It has been known for some time that various quantum
processes can be usefully thought of as games. Quan-
tum cryptography, for example, is readily cast as a game
between the individuals who wish to communicate, and
those who wish to eavesdrop [7]. Quantum cloning has
been thought of as a physicist playing a game against
nature [8], and indeed even the measurement process it-
self may be thought of in these terms [9]. Furthermore,
Meyer [10,11] has pointed out that quantum algorithms
may be usefully thought of as games between classical
and quantum agents. Against this background, it is nat-
ural to seek a unied theory of games and quantum me-
chanics. Such a theory might lend insight into biological
and chemical processes occurring in the quantum regime;
it would certainly provide a fuller understanding of the
physics of information [3].
The fundamental unit of classical information is the
bit. The corresponding unit of quantum information is
the ‘qubit’ { a general quantum superposition of ‘0’ and
‘1’, α0j0i+ α1j1i. In multi-qubit systems, superposition
gives rise to entanglement: qubits are entangled if their
states cannot be dened independently from one another.
Whereas a pair of classical bits must be in one of the four
states f00, 01, 10, 11g, a pair of qubits can be in a state,
such as 1p
2
(j0i⊗j0i+j1i⊗j1i), which cannot be factorized
into two separate qubit states. The interdependence re-
mains even when the two qubits are far apart - this is the
origin of ‘non-local’ eects in quantum mechanics. Al-
though the eect cannot directly transfer information, it
has been identied as a crucial resource in quantum com-
munication, quantum computation and error-correction,
and some forms of quantum cryptography [3]. Here we
will see that when the resources controlled by compet-
ing agents are entangled, they can cooperate to perfectly
exploit their environment (i.e. the ‘game’).
Formally a game involves of a number of agents or
players, who are allowed a certain set of moves or ac-
tions. The payoff function $() species how the players
will be rewarded after they have performed their actions.
The ith player’s strategy, si, is her procedure for decid-
ing which action to play, depending her information. A
strategy space, S = fsig, is the set of strategies available
to her. A strategy profile s = (s1, s2, .., sN) is an assign-
ment of one strategy to each player. An equilibrium is a
strategy prole with a degree of stability: e.g. in a Nash
equilibrium no player can improve her expected payo by
unilaterally changing her strategy. The study of equilib-
ria is fundamental in understanding a game. The games
we consider here are static: they are played only once so
that there is no history for the players to consider. More-
over, each player has complete knowledge of the game’s
structure. Thus the set of allowed actions corresponds
directly to the space of deterministic strategies.
Our procedure for quantizing games is a generalization
of the elegant scheme introduced by Eisert et al. [12,13].
We reason as follows. Game theory, being a branch of
applied mathematics, denes games without reference to
the physical universe. However, quantum mechanics is a
physical theory, and must be applied to a physical sys-
tem. We therefore begin by creating a physical model for
the games of interest. A very natural way to do this is






































































































FIG. 1. a) a physical model for a game in which each player
has two possible actions: we send each player a classical
2-state system (a bit) in the zero state. They locally ma-
nipulate their bit in whatever way they wish: under classical
physics their choices are really just to flip, or not to flip. They
then return the bits for measurement, from which the payo is
determined. b) Our N-player quantized game. Throughout
this paper, ‘measurement’ means measurement in the com-
putational basis, {|0〉, |1〉}. c) The eect of introducing total
decoherence of the quantum information. RND denotes a ran-
dom classical bit, the vertical lines denote CONTROL-NOT.
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This classical physical model is then to be quantized.
Our quantization procedure is the most natural one that
meets the following requirements: (a) The classical infor-
mation carriers (bits) are to be generalized to quantum
systems (qubits). (b) These qubits are to be mutually
entangled [14]. (c) The resulting game must be a gen-
eralization of the classical game: the identity operator I^
should correspond to ‘don’t flip’, and the bit-flipping op-
erator F^ = σ^x should correspond to ‘flip’ [15], in the sense
that when all the players restrict themselves to choosing
from fF^ , I^g, then the payos of the classical game are
recovered. To simultaneously meet requirements (b) and
(c), we employ a pair of entangling gates as shown in
Fig 1(b), and insist that J^ commutes with any operator
formed from F^ and I^ acting in the subspaces of dier-
ent qubits. If we restrict ourselves to unitary, maximally
entangling gates [16] that act symmetrically on ones and
zeros, then we may specify J^ without loss of generality
[17]: J^ = 1p
2
(I^⊗N + iF^⊗N).
In comparing the quantum and classical games, the
choice of strategy space is fundamental. The classical
game is to be embedded in the quantum game, therefore
the space should include playing the ‘classical’ actions
fI^,F^g, but in principle we could choose any superset
of this ‘classical’ space. For example, we could study
the consequences of giving some players a larger strat-
egy space than others [11,13]. Alternatively, we could
force new winning strategies to emerge by permitting
the players some strategy whilst forbidding the logical
counter strategy [13,18]. However, the approach we take
here is to allow all of the players to perform any action
on their qubits which is quantum mechanically possible,
including adjoining arbitrarily large ancillas, performing
measurements and applying operations conditioned on
the outcomes of those measurements. This a very natu-
ral generalization of our classical model, where the only
restrictions on the actions of the players were those im-
posed by classical physics. General quantum operations
are represented by trace-preserving, completely-positive
maps, and we denote the space of strategies correspond-
ing to all such operations by STCP .
In traditional game theory, there is a fundamen-
tal distinction between so-called ‘pure’ strategies, in
which players choose their actions deterministically, and
‘mixed’ strategies which can involve probabilistic choices.
An important consequence of adopting a general quan-
tum model is that the players can implement any proba-
bilistic strategy entirely deterministically through the use
of ancillary qubits. For example, such qubits could func-
tion as a random number generator controlling the oper-
ations applied to the primary qubit. Thus, all quantum
strategies could be argued to be ‘deterministic’. Even so,
there is a subset of STCP that is in many ways analo-
gous to the classical deterministic strategies, namely the
set of all strategies which correspond directly to a uni-
tary action. Strategies from this subset, which we label
SU , imply coherent manipulations of the local qubits, i.e.
manipulations without the addition of ancillary qubits.
Another way of identifying the set SU is that they are
precisely the strategies that do not destroy any of the
entanglement introduced by the J^ gate [19].
For the multi-player games we consider below, we nd
equilibria for all of STCP consisting of strategies drawn
only from SU . We will refer to these special equilibria
as pure, or coherent. They are fundamentally quantum
mechanical, in that they disappear when the quantum
correlations implicit in the entangled states are replaced
with classical correlations, as in Fig. 1(c). In analo-
gous two-player games (where both players are permitted
STCP ) it is impossible for ‘pure’ equilibria [18] to occur
{ instead equilibria exist only when the players choose
to degrade the entanglement. Unsurprisingly therefore,
those equilibria do persist in the Fig 1(c) variant.
Consider the classical N -player Minority Game [20].
Here each player privately chooses between two options,
say ‘0’ and ‘1’. The choices are then compared and the
player(s) who have made the minority decision are re-
warded (by one point, say). If there is an even split,
or if all players have made the same choice, then there
is no reward. The structure of this game reflects many
common social dilemmas, for example choosing a route
in rush hour, choosing which evening to visit an over-
crowded bar, or trading in a nancial market.
Let us focus on the 4-player Minority Game. Classi-
cally, the players have no better strategy than to choose
randomly between the ‘0’ and ‘1’ actions. The expected
payo for each player is then one eighth of a point, i.e. the
game only ‘pays out’ half the time. However, the quan-
tum game exhibits a fundamentally new kind of equi-
librium, one in which each player has expected payo
0.25: twice the performance of the classical game and
the logical maximum for a cooperative solution. One ex-
ample [21] of such an equilibrium is the strategy prole
s = ( 1p
2
(I^ + iσ^x), 1p2 (I^ + iσ^x),
1p
2
(I^ + iσ^x), 1p2 (I^ − iσ^y)).
With these choices, the nal state prior to measurement
is i2 (j1000i+j0100i+j0010i−j1110i), i.e. an equal super-
position of four states, one optimal to each player. The
reasoning below shows that, even with the most general
strategy space STCP , this s is a Nash equilibrium: no
player can improve her expected payo by unilaterally
changing her choice of strategy.
1. Note that the Minority Game has the special prop-
erty that the same expected payos result whether
or not we apply the second gate, J^y, prior to
measurement. This can be seen by noting that
Jy transforms any basis vector jabcdi only within
the sub-space spanned by fjabcdi, jabc dig, where
x = NOT (x). Since both jabcdi and jabc di have
the same payo value, the expected payo is left
invariant by the J^y.
2. Because of (1), we can focus attention on the state
prior to Jy. This state has the property that mea-
surement of any three of the four qubits will yield
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one of the eight outcomes, (000), (001), ...,(111),
with equal probability. This must remain true re-
gardless of what local action was performed on the
fourth qubit. Violation of this physical principle
would mean that entanglement could be used for
faster than light information transfer, for example.
3. Six of these eight outcomes are unwinnable by the
fourth player: if, for example, measurement of the
rst three qubits yields (001), then neither a ‘0’ or a
‘1’ will put the fourth player in the minority. Thus,
because of the equal weighting of the outcomes, her
expected payo cannot exceed 14 . But this is just
the payoff each player has with the originally pro-
posed strategy profile.
This equilibrium is optimal and fair: the game always
pays out the maximal amount and the expected pay-
o for each of the players is the same. In the classical
game, this can be achieved, but only by invoking addi-
tional shared resources [22]. It is interesting to ask, are
there games with coherent quantum equilibria whose per-
formance cannot be matched even by invoking arbitrary
additional classical resources? To answer this question,
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FIG. 2. Games possessing a dominant-strategy equilib-
rium: a) table dening the payos in Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Either player reasons thus: ‘If my partner were to cooper-
ate, my best action would be to defect. If he were to defect,
my best action is still to defect. Thus I have a dominant
strategy: \always defect." ’ b) Table dening the payos for
a three-player game. Classically, each player has the domi-
nant strategy ‘choose 1’. Consequently, each player’s payo is
just 2 points (despite the existence of strategy proles, such
as ‘choose 1 with probability 80%’, for which all the play-
ers have greater expected payos). However in the quantum
game, radically superior new coherent equilibria arise.
A player has a dominant strategy if this strategy yields
a higher payo than any alternative, regardless of the
strategies adopted by other players. A rational player will
always adopt such a strategy, regardless of any additional
information: even prior conversation with other players
makes no dierence (unless we introduce some kind of
binding contract, which amounts to switching to another
game). Most games, including the Minority Game con-
sidered earlier, do not possess dominant strategies. If
every player has a dominant strategy, then the game’s
inevitable outcome is the dominant-strategy equilibrium.
The famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, shown in Fig 2(a), has
the dominant-strategy equilibrium (‘defect’,‘defect’). As
noted above, no maximally entangled two-player quan-
tum game can have equilibria when the strategy space is
SU . Thus, quantization of Prisoner’s Dilemma removes
the dominant-strategy equilibrium [12], but does not pro-
vide alternative coherent equilibria that might oer bet-
ter payos to the players.
To investigate the multi-player case, we quantize the
game of Figure 2(b). We nd that coherent equilibria do
occur. The classically inevitable outcome, now written
as (F^ , F^ , F^ ), remains as a Nash equilibrium { but other,
radically superior equilibria emerge. For example, the
prole s = (I^ , 1p
2
(σ^x + σ^z), σ^x), with expected payos
(5, 9, 5), is a Nash equilibrium (and is strict for players A
and C: any unilateral deviation necessarily leads to reduc-
tion in their expected payos). Thus, as in the Minority
Game, we nd that equilibria consisting of SU actions ex-
ist which drastically out-perform any classical strategies.
The proof runs as follows.
Let jψi = (I^ ⊗ ip
2
(σx + σz) ⊗ I^)J^ j000i be the state
after the actions of players A and B, and suppose that
player C applies a general open quantum operation R,
i.e. a completely positive, trace-preserving map on den-
sity operators. By the Kraus representation theorem [23],
we can write R(ρ) = ∑k AkρAyk, under the restriction∑
k A
y
kAk = I. We may think of this expansion as repre-
senting a k-outcome measurement, where it is allowed to
perform unitary operations conditioned on the outcome
of the measurement. The state-change corresponding
to outcome k is given by jψi 7! (hψjAykAkjψi)−1Akjψi.
Since player C only applies local operations, the most





. But it is then simple to
show, by applying this Ak followed by the gate Jy, that
player C’s expected payo is maximized only if Ak / σx.
Therefore, the only strategy for player C which maxi-
mizes her expected payo for every one of her measure-
ment outcomes is, up to global phase, σx. By repeating
similar arguments for players A and B, we verify that s is
indeed a Nash equilibrium for the full quantum strategy
space STCP .
To conclude, we have performed the rst investigation
of multi-player quantum games. We have determined
that such games can exhibit forms of ‘pure’ quantum
equilibrium which have no analogue in classical games,
or even in two-player quantum games. We have explic-
itly examined the Minority game, and a game analogous
to to Prisoner’s Dilemma. Our observation of purely co-
herent equilibria paves the way for an investigation of
iterated quantum games.
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